We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a broad class of competition models, in which the competing firms' market shares are given by an attraction model, and the aggregate sales in the industry depend on the aggregate attraction value according to a general function. Each firm's revenues and costs are proportional with its expected sales volume, with a cost rate which depends on the firm's chosen attraction value according to an arbitrary increasing function.
Introduction and Summary
Starting with a seminal paper by Friedman (1958) , there is a well established tradition in the economics, marketing and operations literature to model competition in oligopolies by assuming that the firms' sales volumes are specified by a so-called attraction model, see, e.g. Lilien et al. (1992) , Cooper (1993) , Karnani (1985) , Anderson et al. (1992) , Besanko et al. (1998) , So (2000) and Gallego et al. (2006) . In an attraction model, each firm's strategic choices determine a single "attraction value", such that his market share is given by the ratio of this attraction value and the sum of the industry's values. Bell et al. (1975) have shown that this is, in fact, the only representation of market shares to satisfy four simple axioms. With market shares determined by the above ratio rule, the firm's expected sales volumes are gate attraction value, there are models in which aggregate sales decrease as this value improves. This includes the model which motivated our paper and to which we devote its second part. Here, alternative suppliers of a common good compete with each other in terms of certain characteristics of their uncertain yield processes, for example the reliability of each manufacturing batch's yield factor. In this model, which considers either a single buyer or a finite set of buyers, it is in fact possible to derive the suppliers' sales volumes explicitly by identifying the optimal procurement policy of each of the buyers.
(Most competition models assume a specific functional form of the demand functions as exogenously given.) The resulting expected sales volumes imply market shares given by an attraction model with a reliability measure serving as the attraction value; however, as the suppliers improve their reliability, aggregate purchases by the buyers decline, the reduced supply risks reducing the need for safety stocks. Thus, when an individual supplier increases his yield reliability, this results in an increase of his market share, although not necessarily of his expected sales volume. Since the per unit manufacturing cost increases with the selected yield reliability, the yield improvement also results in a reduced profit margin, thus giving rise to intricate sets of tradeoffs.
In this paper, we analyze a general competition model, with market shares determined by an attraction model, and aggregate sales specified as a general function of the aggregate attraction value. Firms compete with each other by selecting their attraction value, which impacts the firm's market share, aggregate sales as well as the per unit cost incurred. Competition models in our literature tend to focus on sufficient conditions with respect to the input parameters and functions, to guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium, possibly in conjunction with its uniqueness. The perspective in this paper is to provide a full characterization of the equilibrium behavior under arbitrary model parameters and cost functions. Often, there are multiple equilibria, in which case we fully characterize their number and relative position vis-a-vis each other. We also show how, in the fully general model, the entry or exit of a supplier impacts on the equilibria. We summarize our main results by describing their application to the above quality competition model. (See also §5 for a summary, in the context of the general model.)
To motivate the latter, note that in most industries, component suppliers or original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) increasingly compete in terms of product attributes other than direct cost. Many goods have become commoditized, and gross profit margins have shrunk, making it increasingly difficult to compete on the basis of price differentials (alone). The supplier's quality and his yield effectiveness and reliability, as measured by the percentage of effectively produced units, rank among the most critical of the various dimensions along which competing firms differentiate themselves. The same applies to suppliers of consumer goods to large department stores, retail organizations or government agencies (in the latter case, e.g., vaccines or medical devices). The yield characteristics include the possibility of complete disruptions due to natural causes, such as fires or hurricanes, man made breakdowns (e.g. sabotage or terrorist attacks), as well as bankruptcies 2 . Many companies have adopted a multi-sourcing strategy, splitting orders among competing suppliers so as to mitigate various supplier risks.
Our quality competition model considers an industry with N potential suppliers competing for the business of B buyers, in a single sales season. To facilitate the exposition, we initially consider a single purchasing firm or agency. However, almost all of our results carry over to the general oligopsony case with an arbitrary number of buyers, see Appendix EC.4. The purchasing firm faces an uncertain demand volume, while each of the suppliers experiences a given random yield factor. In the face of the combined 2 Even before the 2008 financial crisis, Babich et al. (2007) describe the severity of this type of risk: "Credit rating firms report that in 2002 over 240 firms defaulted on 160 billion dollars of debt, the largest amount ever over any one year period. . . . The combined volume of defaults in 2001 and 2002 exceeded the total volume of defaults in the US over the previous twenty years. What is especially striking about the current trends is the surge in the defaults of large, well-established companies. Even in the relative stable years [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , almost 50 firms with assets or liabilities exceeding one billion dollars have filed for bankruptcy." In the automobile industry, for example, many suppliers routinely incur losses, with Delphi, the largest supplier of automotive parts in the United States, residing in Chapter 11, until recently. Choi and Hartley (1996) document that in this industry, purchasing managers consider the financial solvability of the suppliers a major selection criterion, along with criteria like consistency and reliability.
value, given by a simple function of the permitted shortfall probability. (If this condition is violated, the buyer may not be able to satisfy her service constraint, under certain yield choices of the suppliers; see, below, for a characterization of the equilibrium behavior in this case.) Under multiple equilibria, there exists one which is componentwise smallest and one which is componentwise largest. Among all equilibria, the former is the most preferred, and the latter the least preferred, by all suppliers, while the opposite applies to the buyer. Also, under convex manufacturing cost rates, for example, all equilibria are completely ordered, i.e., if one supplier adopts a higher reliability measure under one equilibrium as opposed to an alternative equilibrium, the same applies to all of his competitors.
In our numerical studies, we have observed that multiple equilibria arise frequently, and the largest and smallest equilibria are often far apart. Assuming suppliers dynamically adjust their yield choices (e.g., as best responses to the competitors' choices), the industry's equilibrium depends heavily on its initial choices: for example, if all suppliers start out with low (high) yield reliabilities, we show that the industry adopts the smallest (largest) equilibrium. This suggests that there is great permanent value to adopt short term incentives (e.g., the imposition of the above minimum reliability standards)
for suppliers to invest in yield improvements. Because of the competitive dynamics, such short term incentives sustain themselves in the long run.
Any equilibrium is characterized by a set of suppliers which operate at their minimum standard level and a complementary set which choose to go beyond their minimum. We show that when each firm's per unit production cost grows convexly with its chosen yield reliability, the set of "minimum performance" suppliers is consecutive in a specific supplier index. This index depends on the supplier's minimum reliability standard and his marginal cost rate and profit margin when operating at this reliability level. Finally, under an additional condition, broadly satisfied, we derive a bound for the number of distinct equilibria. We show that improving the minimum standards may eliminate a low performance equilibrium and drive the suppliers to one in which they very significantly outperform these standards. Thereafter, the high performance equilibrium is often self-sustaining, even when the minimum standards are no longer enforced.
We show that, under both the smallest and the largest equilibrium, all suppliers react to a sales price decrease by investing in a lower yield reliability. (All of the comparative statistics results, described
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below, refer, likewise, to the smallest and largest equilibrium.) In settings where the buyer has the bargaining power to reduce the sales price, exercising this power has the, perhaps unintended, consequence of incentivizing all suppliers to reduce their reliability investments. This phenomenon has been documented, for example, in the vaccine supply industry, see §4.
When a single supplier is able to increase his yield target, i.e., the mean of his yield distribution, all suppliers increase their yield reliability. We also show that every new entrant to the market causes all incumbents to improve their yield reliability; conversely, every departure from the industry induces all remaining firms to reduce it. When the mean demand volume goes up, the suppliers react by reducing their yield reliability, but when the standard deviation of the demand volume goes up, they respond by increasing their yield reliability. More comprehensively, we show that suppliers find it in their competitive interest to respond to increased volatility of the buyer's demand volume, i.e., an increased coefficient of variation of the demand distribution, by increasing their yield reliability; at the same time, they exploit increased risk averseness of the buyer, i.e., a lower tolerance for the shortfall probability, by reducing their equilibrium yield reliability so as to force the buyer to increase purchase orders.
In symmetric models, there exists a critical number of suppliers N 0 (x) -which depends on the minimal standard x -such that the equilibrium is unique (and larger than the minimum standard) if the number of suppliers N is in excess of N 0 (x). If N is smaller than this critical number of firms, the minimum standard x represents one equilibrium, possibly in conjunction with one or two symmetric equilibria in which all suppliers adopt a common higher reliability value.
We obtain similar characterizations of the equilibrium behavior, for the other two competition models. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in §2, we provide an overview of the related literature. In §3, we characterize the equilibrium behavior in the above defined general class of competition models. §4 applies the results of §3 to the aforementioned quality competition models. §5 concludes the paper with a summary of important conclusions. All proofs are relegated to EC.1.
Literature Review
In §1, we have surveyed the literature on competition under attraction models. In this section, we give a brief review of the literature directly relevant to the quality competition model. The economics literature treats quality as a differentiating attribute of the product rather than its procurement process; see Appendix EC.2 for a brief review.
Very few papers analyze the impacts of uncertain yields in decentralized supply chains. The recent paper by Zhu et al. (2007) comments in its opening paragraph, "Although researchers in operations management have long realized the importance of operations beyond the walls of a firm and explored various management issues for better coordination along supply chains, research on quality improvement has been largely limited to operations inside the walls of a firm." Likewise, in their survey paper, Tsay et al. (1999) note that only a few models consider the choice of the quality level, and, if so, primarily "from the vantage point of a single organization contemplating how to design its internal practices in light of its own costs of quality." Zhu et al. (2007) analyze a model with a single supplier and a single buyer facing a deterministic demand process, in which the buyer and the supplier sequentially decide to invest in an improvement of the yield characteristics of the supplier's production process. Babich et al. (2007) consider an industry with two suppliers and one buyer. Particularly motivated by the risk of suppliers' defaulting and therefore not being able to deliver on their orders, the authors assume that each supplier's random yield factor is a Bernoulli random variable, which is equal to zero, with a probability given by the firm's likelihood of default. The two firms compete by selecting a unit price. Corbett and Deo (2006) assume that an arbitrary number of suppliers, offering a homogenous good, engage in Cournot competition, where the (common) per unit price is a linear function of the total actual supply offered to the market. (A firm's actual supply is its intended production volume multiplied with a random yield factor, which is independently generated from a common distribution.) The firms compete by selecting their intended production volumes. Corbett and Deo (2006) use their model to explain the number of flu vaccine suppliers in the United States. Chick et al. (2006) consider a supply chain with a single buyer and a single supplier, whose random yield factor follows a general distribution.
The buyer derives a benefit from its order, the magnitude of which grows as a concave function of the order size.
3 The authors characterize how the buyer and the supplier sequentially determine their order Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
size and intended production volume. To our knowledge, ours is the first model to analyze a supply chain in which suppliers compete by targeting key characteristics of their uncertain yield processes.
Competition Under a General Attraction Model
Consider an industry with N firms, each selling a specific good or service, at a given unit price. As in standard attraction models, each firm i's market share is proportional to its attraction value x i , which can be selected within a given range [x i , x i ] (i = 1, . . . , N ). The attraction values sometimes denote a single strategic choice, for example, the firm's advertising budget in Friedman (1958) , or the firm's manufacturing yield reliability in the quality competition model of §4. In other settings, it is a function of, several strategic choices: to give but a few examples, in the combined price and quality multinomial logit competition model in Anderson et al. (1992) , the attraction value is an exponential function of a linear combination of the firm's price and quality level. In Bernstein and Federgruen (2004) , the attraction value is a general function of the firm's price and service level, characterized by its fill-rate. Kotler (1965) specifies the attraction value as a function of the firm's price, advertising and distribution budget, while Carpenter et al. (1988) model it as a function of a variety of marketing instruments.
As to the aggregate expected sales in the industry, we assume that it is determined by the aggregate attraction value. The cost incurred by a firm is proportional to its sales volume, with a cost rate which is nondecreasing in the firm's attraction value. This assumption is made in many competition papers with attraction models, for example, the quality competition model in Anderson et al. (1992, §7.5.2) , or the price-service level competition model of Bernstein and Federgruen (2004) , in which all costs are shown to be proportional with the expected sales volume, at a rate which is increasing and convex in the chosen fill-rate or attraction value. Gallego et al. (2006) [Besanko et al. (1998) , So (2000) ] assume that the operational cost of each supplier is given by a convex [linear] function of his demand volume, the shape of which is independent of the strategic choices. 4 Thus, let s i = the expected sales volume of firm i, i = 1, . . . , N w i = the per unit sales price of firm i, i = 1, . . . , N c i (x i ) = the per unit cost rate of firm i, a nondecreasing, twice differentiable function of the attraction
The assumptions of the generalized attraction model imply that
where T (·) describes how the total market size varies with the chosen attraction values x. Many models specify T (·) as a constant M . Other papers use the specification
This total sales function arises when assuming a given population of M individuals, each of whom either purchase one unit from one of the firms or nothing at all, C represents the attraction value of the no-purchase option, and the likelihood of an individual choosing a specific option is proportional to its attraction value. Several marketing papers, including Kotler (1965) , Karnani (1985) and Basuroy and Nguyen (1998) , assume T (R) = M R β for some 0 β < 1 to represent a market which increases with the aggregate attraction value, however at a decreasing marginal rate. While all of the above specifications use an increasing T (·) function, the endogenously derived total sales function in the quality competition model of §4 is, in fact, decreasing for reasons explained in the Introduction; see (12) for its closed form expression. Below, we take T (·) as a general, twice differentiable function.
The lower bounds {x i } are sometimes endogenous to the model. In other settings, these bounds are exogenously imposed by company policies or government regulations, see e. g. §4. As to the upper
ensure a nonnegative profit value. In the analysis below, we therefore assume
all of our results are easily extended when these upper bounds need to be specified at lower levels.
Firm i's expected profit function is given by:
With x −i = j =i x j , it is easier to employ
Thus, the marginal profit increase of a firm due to a marginal increase in his attraction value, depends on the competitors' strategic choices, only via their sum, x −i . The dependence is captured by the function The attraction intensity A(R) = R/T (R) is log-concave in R.
Theorem 1 (Existence of Equilibria). Assume (A).
(a) The competition game is (log-)supermodular and has at least one equilibrium. We note that the attraction intensity function A(R) = R/T (R) is both log-concave and increasing in all of the above examples. This is easily verified for the case where the aggregate sales function T (R) is constant, or of the form (2) or a power function T (R) = M R β with 0 β < 1. We refer to Lemma 1, below, for a verification of these properties in the quality competition model of §4. Since the competition model is a supermodular game, both the smallest and largest equilibrium can be computed by a simple tatônnement scheme (with x and x as the starting point, respectively), in which, in each iteration, each firm determines his best response to the competitors' choices.
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As will be shown in §4, multiple equilibria often arise. While the shape of the aggregate sales function T (R), via that of the associated attraction intensity function A(R), determines whether the game is supermodular or not, and in particular, whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists, additional information about the number of equilibria and their structure (, beyond them constituting a lattice,) depend on the properties of the G i (·)-functions, i = 1, . . . , N . 6 The shape of the G i (·)-functions only depends on the shape of the cost rate functions as well as the magnitude of the variable profit margins {w i − c i (·)}.
Among these structural properties, the following are of particular importance: (i) which of the firms adopt their minimally feasible attraction value and which choose to invest in a larger value? (ii) when is the set of equilibria an ordered set, i. e., for any pair of equilibria x * and x * * , either x * x * * or x * x * * ? Assuming the attraction intensity function A(R) is increasing, one implication of the set of the equilibria being ordered is that all equilibria can be uniformly ordered in terms of each of the firms' preferences: All firms are worse off, as we move from one equilibrium to another with a larger attraction value for some, and hence for all firms. (Theorem 2, below, shows that this situation arises, for example, whenever the cost rate functions c i (·) are convex.) While the firms uniformly prefer equilibria with lower attraction values, often the consumer has the opposite preference ranking, generating industrial policy challenges; see §4 for a discussion of the latter.
We focus on the case where the G i (·)-functions are strictly decreasing with inverse functions G
. . , N . This property applies, for example, when the cost-rate functions c i (·) are convex, since
See however, Remark 1 below for a discussion of the case where all G i (·) functions are increasing.
Consider a starting point where all firms operate at their minimum attraction levels {x i }. Let R(k) def = 5 Topkis (1998) considers two variants of the tatônnement scheme: (i) simultaneous optimization: here, in each iteration, all firms assume their competitors stay with their choices in the previous iteration; (ii) Round Robin: here, in each iteration, one cycles through the N suppliers and each determines a best response to the most recently adopted choices of the competitors.
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. k i=1 x i denote the aggregate minimum attraction value of the first k firms. Let S denote the set of firms who would be worse off by making marginal improvements to their minimum level, i.e., by (4),
note that this index value only depends on the firm's own cost rate function, his minimum attraction value and his sales price. Without loss of generality, number the suppliers in increasing order of their index values, i.e., I 1 I 2 · · · I N . With this numbering, S = {1, . . . , |S|} and |S| is the highest indexed supplier whose index value I i is below H(R(N )), i.e., |S| = max{i : I i H(R(N ))}. For any equilibrium (a-i) For every equilibrium x * , there exists some k
(a-ii) x * is of the following form:
where ρ is a root of the characteristic equation:
(a-iii) Any pair of equilibria x * and x * * is completely ordered, i.e., either x *
and, assuming the attraction intensity A(R) is increasing, all firms are better off under x * as compared to x * * .
(b) Assume Condition (G) applies:
is strictly concave, so that (8) has at most two roots ρ ρ.
(b-i) For any 1 k |S|, there exists at most one equilibrium x * such that k * (x * ) = k. Such an equilibrium x * (k) satisfies (7) with ρ = ρ.
(b-ii) There exist at most two interior equilibria x * (0) and x * (0), with x *
(b-iii) There exist at most |S| + 2 equilibria. The following Theorem considers the special case where the model is symmetric, i.e., all firms have identical characteristics. In this case, let c(·)
Also, define x 0 as the unique root of G(·), which exists since G(·) is strictly decreasing, while lim x↓0 G(x) = ∞ and lim x↑x G(x) = −∞.
Theorem 3 (Symmetric Case). Assume identical firms, condition (A), and G(·) decreasing.
(a) There exists at least one equilibrium. All equilibria are ordered and symmetric.
(b) Assume in addition that the attraction intensity function A(R) = R/T (R) is increasing and the minimum reliability standard x x 0 . The vector x is the unique equilibrium, irrespective of the number of firms in the industry.
(c) Assume Condition (G). There exists a number of firms
, there exists a unique equilibrium x * which is symmetric and interior and whose common component x * is the larger (or unique) root of the characteristic equation:
This unique equilibrium increases with every new entering firm.
, the set of equilibria consists of x, possibly in conjunction with one or two symmetric and interior equilibria, the common component of which is one of the (at most two) roots of the characteristic equation (9).
Thus, when x > x 0 , the minimum attraction level is set at a high enough level that x arises as the unique equilibrium, irrespective of the number of firms in the industry, as long as the function A(R) = R/T (R)
is increasing, a condition trivially satisfied in all of the above reviewed models. When x x 0 , the shape of the G(·) function impacts on the equilibrium behavior. However, under condition (G) and assuming N 1 (x) < ∞, a unique equilibrium is again guaranteed, as long as the number of competitors is sufficiently large, and under this unique equilibrium, all firms exceed the minimum standard, and increase their attraction value as the competition becomes fiercer, i.e., as the number of firms grows.
Remark 1. We complete this section with a discussion of the case where, for each firm i = 1, . . . , N ,
This case cannot occur when, as hitherto assumed, the upper bound value 
The Quality Competition Model
Consider an industry with N suppliers of a given product, competing for the business of a single buyer in a specific sales season. (See however Appendix EC.4 for a generalization of our results to allow for any number of buyers.) Each of the suppliers encounters an uncertain yield factor, with a given, general and supplier-dependent yield distribution. The buyer faces uncertain demand over the course of the season, with a Normal distribution. Her challenge is to select a set of suppliers, a total order quantity as well as its allocation among the selected suppliers so as to ensure that her demand is met with a given minimum probability, while minimizing procurement costs. (An alternative representation of the buyer's procurement problem, discussed in §4.5, involves explicit shortage and overage costs.) The suppliers compete by selecting key characteristics of their yield distributions, either their means,
The above representation assumes a single round of sales, without any recourse options. This assumption reflects many practical situations with long leadtimes. Nevertheless, its relaxation to allow for multiple procurement rounds would be valuable, although it results in much more complex dynamic Stackelberg games. It is therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
their standard deviations or both. 8 These choices have implications for their per unit cost rates. We initially assume that the suppliers' prices are identical. This assumption often applies per se, as many industries have become commoditized. 9 (In §4.4, we discuss the general case, where the suppliers differentiate themselves on the basis of their prices, as well.) The suppliers operate in a make-to-order or purchase-to-order environment, which permits them to defer commitment to all material and other variable costs until the buyer's orders are received.
We also assume that the buyer only pays for delivered units which are useable, i.e., satisfy the quality standards. This assumption is adopted by the majority of the literature on random yield supply systems.
10 The practitioner oriented outsourcing literature, e. g., Brown and Wilson (2005) , refers to this as fixed pricing schemes. (In §4.4, we analyze other settings, where the buyer is required to pay for all units ordered and entered into the production process, or where the buyer incurs two cost rates, one that applies to all units ordered and the other which is charged only for the useable ones.) Thus, let: 
w = the price charged to the buyer for every effectively delivered unit; α = maximum permitted probability of a shortfall;
8 In the Electronic Design Automation (EDA) industry, manufacturers focus their competitive strategies on "Design For Yield" (DFY). Similarly, Pisano (1996) documents that in the pharmaceutical and bio-technology industries, firms control the characteristics of their yield distributions by deciding how much time and effort to allocate to the product and process phase. Özer et al. (2007) describe how suppliers in the semiconductor industry strategize on how much time and effort to put into the design phase to improve their yield characteristics; they report a graph by Hitachi GST exhibiting the dependence of the yield characteristics with respect to the length of the design phase. Firms are also able to (partially) control their perceived reliability and estimated financial default probabilities, by adopting an appropriate financial structure.
9 See also surveys like Choi and Hartley (1996) for the automobile industry, concluding that "price is one of the least important selection criteria, [again] regardless of the position in the supply chain."
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= the (optimal) expected aggregate sales of the suppliers.
The general yield distributions allow for a positive probability mass at zero, to reflect the possibility of a total supply disruption or breakdown, financial defaults, batch failures or acceptance sampling, as well as supplier delays resulting in untimely deliveries. The Normal distribution provides an adequate and frequently used specification of the demand distribution. We assume
ensuring that the likelihood of the demand volume D assuming negative values is no larger than the permitted shortfall probability α.
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The cost rate functions c i (p i , ς i ) may be derived from an underlying more primitive description of the cost structure: for example, assume first that all of supplier i's labor and material costs are incurred for every attempted unit, whether ultimately resulting in an effective unit or not, and the cost per unit is given by c i (p i , ς i ). The supplier's cost associated with an order of size y i , is then given
/p i may be interpreted as the expected cost incurred for each effective unit that is procured. However, some cost components (e.g., packaging, warehousing and shipping cost) may be incurred only for effective units, that satisfy the required quality specifications. Assume these cost components amount to c
i (p i , ς i ) per (effective) unit. In this case, the total variable costs incurred by supplier i is given by c i (
limiting behavior applies to the cost rates c i (p i , ς i ) as well.
An important assumption in our model is that the buyer determines all gross (production or purchasing) orders from the various suppliers. This assumption is shared with the entire, above discussed, literature on inventory systems with random yields. One might envision a setting where the buyer specifies a (maximum) purchase quantity of useable units from a supplier, who proceeds to determine a gross order quantity which optimally balances the supplier 's risk of overage and underage, vis-a-vis the desired purchase quantity. However, the supplier is often not in a position to target a specific supply of useable units, in particular when there is a significant likelihood of a complete disruption, i.e., when the yield distribution has a positive mass at zero. (Recall that such yield distributions are required to model supply chain disruptions, financial defaults, batch failures, acceptance sampling and untimely deliveries, among others. In such cases, the supplier fails to meet any desired purchase quantity, with this probability, regardless of what gross order size he initiates.) Finally, the supplier can only commit himself to a given purchase quantity of good units, if (full) inspection of all produced units takes place at the supplier's site. This is often impossible or impractical, see, for example, Baiman et al. (2000) and Balachandran and Radhakrishnan (2005) , in particular when failures occur during the distribution process to the buyer or failures can only be observed externally by the consumer during the consumption process. (The buyer is often committed to exchange any failing unit for a good one, and her purchase quantities from the suppliers must adequately include an appropriate stock of replacement units.) The buyer's service level constraint can be formulated as:
We assume that the end of the period inventory level (
is Normal. This applies, of course, when all yield distributions are Normal themselves. In addition, it applies as a close approximation, when the yield distributions are nearly Normal or when there are at least 4 suppliers, even when these distributions have a fundamentally different shape. (Diversification among 4 or more suppliers occurs for example, in the vaccine industry, discussed below, as well as for distributors of food items, see Sheffi (2005, page 216-217) for a discussion of the banana industry.) We refer to Yang (2008a, 2008b) for an extensive discussion, theoretical foundations as well as numerical investigations of the adequacy of the Normal approximation.
12
With unreliable suppliers, even the existence of a feasible procurement strategy is questionable, as simple examples exhibit. (For example, when all yield factors have a probability mass in zero, with p = Pr(X i = 0), a feasible solution fails to exist if p N > α.) When the end-of-the-season inventory is (assumed to be) Normal, a set of suppliers is feasible if and only if its aggregate reliability measure
α , a simple function of the permitted shortfall probability α, only.
Lemma 1 (Characterization of the Optimal Expected Sales Volumes).
(a) A feasible solution exists if and only if
α , the expected sales volumes are given by:
where
with T (·) a decreasing function.
(c) H(R) is a positive, strictly decreasing and strictly convex function.
We conclude that the expected sales volumes have the structure of the generalized attraction model in §3, with a decreasing total sales function T (·). Moreover, since H(·) is decreasing, the attraction intensity function A(·) is log-concave, i.e., assumption (A) is satisfied, by itself guaranteeing that any of the competition models, below, are (log-)supermodular and hence have either a unique pure Nash equilibrium or a componentwise smallest and a componentwise largest Nash equilibrium, see Theo- equilibrium, among all possible equilibria.
In the remainder, we analyze various types of competition between the suppliers. These are represented as Stackelberg games, in the sense that suppliers first engage in a non-cooperative game to select specific yield characteristics, followed by the buyer's decisions as to how much to order from each. Our model assumes symmetric information among all parties concerned. In particular, the buyer knows the mean and standard deviation of each of the suppliers' yield factors on the basis of qualification processes, declared standards or prior experience in earlier sales seasons. 13 As to the suppliers, we will show that each only needs to know the total reliability measure in the industry, to determine his best response function. Thus, the information requirements for the various firms are limited, and, in many applications, it is reasonable to assume that they are met. Nevertheless, future work should address settings where some of the distributional parameters may only be known imperfectly, thus calling for game theoretical models with asymmetric information.
The Yield Predictability Competition Model (YPC)
In this subsection, we model competition between the suppliers assuming they select a predictability level for their yield distribution. A predictability level can be targeted by adopting appropriate design and technology choices or quality control processes. Since competition is restricted to the choices of the standard deviations of the yield distributions, we assume, here, that the yield targets {p i } are exogenously given at levels p i = p
As far as the per unit cost rate functions c i (·, ·) are concerned, in this model, we merely assume
to reflect the fact that a less volatile yield distribution can only be achieved by adopting better materials, technologies and quality processes, as well as higher investments in the design phase.
For any supplier i, selecting the yield standard deviation ς i , is equivalent to selecting the c.v. value
and hence x i = 0 to enable the modeling of firms entering the industry.) To highlight the dependence of any supplier i's cost of manufacturing an effective unit on x i , define:
which is clearly strictly increasing in
, it is less costly to procure an effective unit with a given reliability measure x i when the supplier's expected yield is larger:
In choosing a reliability level x i , firm i faces a natural upper limit:
(The gross profit margin per effectively delivered unit for supplier i is given by w − c
Note from (14) and (15) 
In addition, a lower bound x e i , independent of the yield target p 0 i , may be imposed, either by the buyer, or by external stipulations, such as government regulations. 14 Thus, let 
(We revisit this assumption at the end of this subsection.) To simplify the notation, we generally, suppress the dependence of the parameters with respect to p 0 i . As in (5), we define G
Theorem 4 (Yield Predicatability Competition Model). Assume (18).
14 For example, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) purchases more than 50% of all routinely administered vaccines in the United States through the Vaccine Assistance Act (Section 317 of the Public Health Service Act, 1963) and the VFC (Vaccines For Children Act) program, which was established in 1994. To enforce minimum reliability standards, the CDC together with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) established current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMPs) which required many of the vaccine manufacturers to renovate their facilities, see Klein and Myers (2006) . Many manufacturers institute qualification processes for which any potential supplier must compete to become part of the supplier base, see Gerling et al. (2002) 
See Appendix EC.3 for the proof that (G
The phenomenon of multiple equilibria is not just a theoretical possibility. We have encountered many instances with either two or three equilibria, even when all of the procurement cost functions are linear. Moreover, the equilibria are often far apart. Assume that firms dynamically adjust their choices before converging to an equilibrium, perhaps by iteratively selecting best responses to the choices made by its competitors. The adopted equilibrium is then critically dependent on the starting conditions of the industry. As mentioned, since the game is supermodular, we know that the (componentwise) smallest equilibrium is adopted when the firms start off at or close to the vector of minimum reliability standards x, while the (componentwise) largest equilibrium arises when the firms start off at high levels of reliability close to the x-values. By Theorem 2(a), assuming convex cost rate functions c suppliers, as we move from the largest equilibrium to smaller ones; conversely, the buyer is progressively worse off, since her total cost is given by wY * E , which by Lemma 1 is decreasing in
The above observations have the following public policy implication: to ensure that the industry adopts a long-term equilibrium with relatively high reliability measures, it may pay to provide shortterm incentives, via tax credits, subsidies or the like, for the firms to invest in reliability improvements, thus inducing a high performance equilibrium. Even if the incentives are eliminated after a while, firms
are likely to readjust to a high performance equilibrium, given their starting conditions. In addition, an increase of the minimum reliability standards x may be used to induce a much larger impact on the industry's equilibrium behavior. This is demonstrated by the following example: (c-ii) In both the smallest and largest equilibrium, a new entrant (firm N +1) causes all incumbent firms to increase their reliability measures, resulting in a decrease of the buyer's cost.
One implication of the first monotonicity result is that the buyer "pays" for a lower unit price by having to cope with less reliable yield processes, at all suppliers. For example, in the vaccine supplier industry, the CDC is chartered to pay as little, for established vaccines, as it is able to negotiate. Indeed, Table 2 in Klein and Myers (2006) shows that the federally contracted prices are on average 40% lower than the catalog price which applies to the private sector sales. The National Vaccine Advisory
Committee has identified this fact and the resulting reduced profit margins as one of the primary reasons why suppliers have left the industry. In the United States, the number of vaccine manufacturers has dropped from 26 in 1967 to a mere 6 in 2006. Indeed, it follows from part (c-ii) that the exit of many suppliers causes the equilibrium reliability choices to go down, by itself. However, not recognized in the committee's report is the fact that the highly reduced prices may well have eliminated incentives to improve yield reliabilities among those suppliers that chose to stay in the market. Thus, vaccine supplies may have become increasingly unreliable, not just because the number of suppliers decreased, but also because the federal contracts incentivized the remaining suppliers to adopt low levels of yield reliability, a phenomenon explained by part (b). In contrast, if new vaccines become covered by the VFC program, the CDC is required to purchase them at a price close to the supplier's catalog price. This policy has the unintended effect of incentivizing the industry to concentrate on new vaccines rather than to exploit the learning curve and improve the manufacturing processes for more established products.
To illustrate Theorem 5, consider in Example 1, a reduction of the price w. As long as w 75, three equilibria continue to prevail. For example, when w = 75, the three equilibria are x * L = x, x * M = (6.02, 5.47, 4.96) and x * H = (20.95, 13.95, 10.29); each of the smallest and largest equilibria is componentwise smaller than its counterpart when w = 1000. When w = 74, there are only two equilibria, i.e.
x * L = x and x * H = (20.58, 13.73, 10.13), once again demonstrating the componentwise monotonicity of the smallest and largest equilibria. Finally, the theorem is silent about whether the equilibria are monotone in the minimum reliability standards x. Indeed, the following example shows that, for example, the largest equilibrium may fail to be monotone. In this case, supplier 2's minimum standard is increased from 157.73 to 225.55, forcing him to increase his reliability to the new minimum standards. However, all other suppliers decrease their reliabilities.
We conclude this subsection with a discussion of what happens when condition (18) is violated, but
i.e., under some but not all reliability measure vectors x, the buyer is incapable of meeting her service constraint. Under such vectors x, no orders will be placed, resulting in zero profit for each supplier. It is easily verified that no (pure) equilibrium exists under which the buyer is serviced, if
(Let x i − x i = max 1 j N (x j − x j ) > 0. Under any equilibrium x * under which the buyer is serviced, (21), the new total reliability value is z 2 α + ǫ. It follows from Lemma 1 that as ǫ continues to decrease, the total order placed by the buyer goes to infinity, as does the order received by firm i, since his market share approaches (z
Finally, firm i's profit margin approaches
In other words, as ǫ ↓ 0, firm i's profit grows infinitely large, contradicting the assumption that x * is an equilibrium.) Under (21), at least one of the suppliers is an essential market maker, in the sense that, irrespective of his competitors' choices, this firm is capable of creating an infeasible situation for the buyer.
The most complex situation arises in the intermediate case where (18) is violated, i.e. some reliability choices result in an infeasible solution, but no single firm is an essential market maker, i.e., (a) x * is a local Nash equilibrium, i.e., every firm's choice is a local maximum of his profit function,
To verify the sufficiency, note that under (c), no individual firm can create an infeasible situation by deviating. Moreover, by (a), x * i is a local maximum and by (b), the only other possible local maximum has an inferior profit value. The necessity of each of the parts (a), (b) and (c) is immediate.
The Yield Target Competition Model (YTC)
Assume, now, that each supplier i selects his yield target p i , under a given standard deviation ς 0 i of its yield distribution. Analogous to (13), we again need a single condition with respect to the shape of the unit cost rate functions c i (·, ·). In fact, instead of requiring monotone behavior, all we require is that the function c i (·, ς 0 i ) is quasi-convex, i.e., it is either increasing or it decreases first until a point p
and is increasing thereafter.
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The (YTC)-Model may be specified as one in which each supplier selects his reliability level
, an increasing function of x i , for
Clearly, no choice with
is sensible for firm i: After all, by moving from p i < p
i simultaneously improves his profit margin and his market share. Therefore, we specify x i , as the larger of any externally specified minimum reliability standard x e i , or x 0 i . Analogous to (15), we specify
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. firm's entry cannot be modeled as if the firm were "present" both before and after entry, however with a change in one or more parameters, with respect to which the equilibria can be shown to be monotone.
It is again easily verified that G
T i (x) = −c T ′ i (x)/(w − c T i (x)) + 1/x. Since,
Simultaneous Yield Target and Predictability Competition Model (YSC)
Consider now a setting, where each firm i is capable of selecting both the mean and the standard deviation of his yield distribution, or equivalently, both his yield target and reliability measure (p i , x i ).
Analogous to (3), the profit functions can be written as:
. . , N . Observe, for any given firm i, that while the choice of x i affects not just his own profit function but those of all of his competitors, the choice of p i -given a value for x i -only impacts this firm's own profit. To allow for a simple analysis, we assume beyond the monotonicity of c i (·, ·) in its second argument, and the quasi-convexity in its first that
where c i1 and c i2 refer to the partial derivatives of the c i -function with respect to their first and second arguments. (This additional condition is trivially satisfied on the range where the cost rate functions decrease with the target level; on the other range, it requires that the cost reduction due to an increase in the yield standard deviation dominates the cost increase due to the improved yield target.) For a given choice of x i , it is, in view of (22), optimal to select as high as possible a yield target p i , i.e., see (16) . It is therefore possible to reduce the two-dimensional competition model to an equivalent one-dimensional competition model, with profit functions:
where c
. Without loss of practical generality, p i 0.5, i.e., x i 1. It is easily verified that the function c 
Competition under Price Differentiation
Hitherto, we have assumed that suppliers differentiate themselves only in terms of their yield distributions. In this case, each supplier i achieves a positive market share, irrespective of its reliability, which patronized by the buyer, see Dada et al. (2007) and Federgruen and Yang (2008b) .
While the suppliers' sales functions can still be computed efficiently (by Algorithm (SCM) in Federgruen and Yang (2008b)), they are not available in closed form. Example EC.1 in EC.5 shows, in fact, Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
that the profit functions in the (YPC)-model may fail to be supermodular. Moreover, the model may in some instances fail to have a (pure) Nash equilibrium, albeit that in our investigations, to date, this only occurs under unrealistically large supplier markups.
Procurement Decisions Based on Costs of Over-and Under-Stockage
As a final variant of our model, assume the buyer determines her procurement decisions on the basis of a traditional tradeoff analysis of the cost of over-and under-stockage, rather than the service level constraint (11). Thus, let h denote the carrying cost of any unsold unit at the end of the season, and b the cost of any unmet demand. Federgruen and Yang (2008b) have shown, that, under identical supplier prices, all suppliers attain a positive market share, with the share for supplier i again given by
Also, the buyer's optimal cost, under a given targeted effective supply Y E , is: Federgruen and Yang (2008b) shows that aggregate sales may, sometimes, increase as " P N i=1 xi " ↑ ∞, i. e. as one approaches full reliability.
numerical exploration. In other words, the structural properties of the equilibrium behavior of the model are the same, regardless of whether the buyer determines her procurement decisions on the basis of a service level constraint or so as to minimize purchase-, inventory carrying-and shortage-costs.
Conclusions
We have characterized the equilibrium behavior in a broad class of competition models, in which the competing firms' market shares are given by an attraction model, and the aggregate sales in the industry depend on the aggregate attraction value according to a general function. Each firm's revenues and costs are proportional with its expected sales volume, with a cost rate which depends on the firm's chosen attraction value according to an arbitrary increasing function. We have shown that most existing competition papers with attraction models, in the economics, marketing and operations literature, can be viewed as special cases of this general model. The general model also includes a new series of quality competition models among suppliers with uncertain yield characteristics, developed in the previous section. Unlike existing applications, in these competition models, the total sales function is decreasing with the aggregate attraction value.
We have shown that the general competition model can be guaranteed to be (log-)supermodular, based on a single property of the so-called attraction intensity function, defined as the ratio of the aggregate attraction value and aggregate sales. The required property is the log-concavity of this attraction intensity function, which is satisfied in all of the reviewed applications of the general model. Logsupermodularity of the competition model implies that it has a pure Nash equilibrium and, in case of Applying our results to the quality competition models, we have shown that multiple equilibria arise frequently and they are often far apart. Assuming a simple dynamic adjustment process, we have shown that which of the equilibria is adopted may be influenced by the starting conditions of the industry. This suggests that temporary incentives to invest in high quality processes result in long term adherence to higher quality equilibria, even after the incentives are dropped. Selection of the minimum standards provides a second mechanism to induce significant reliability improvements: examples show how an increase of the minimum standards by less than 50% can induce all competitors to reduce the c.v.-value of their yield factor by a factor of 10. Reducing barriers to industry entry provides a third such mechanism: any new entrant causes both the smallest and largest equilibrium to go up componentwise. Finally, buyers may face a low reliability equilibrium and end up incurring higher total costs when forcing their suppliers to accept low sales prices. Also, we have systematically exhibited how the (smallest and largest) equilibria depend on the various model parameters.
EC.1. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
Since each firm's feasible action set is compact, this implies that the game is (log-)supermodular. Part (a) thus follows from Topkis (1998).
(b) We prove the following more general result: Let x * x * * denote two equilibria. For each firm i = 1, . . . , N :
The first inequality follows from (3), using the fact that T (R)/R is a decreasing function and
The second inequality is immediate from the fact that x * is an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2:
(a) By (A), H(·) is strictly decreasing, so that G
is a strictly increasing function for all
We have:
where the first inequality follows from the fact that G i (x i ) is a strictly decreasing function and the second inequality from the definition of the firm index and the numbering of the firms. Assuming, to the contrary that j ∈ S(x * ), i.e., x * j = x j , we have, by (EC.3) that:
(x * ) = 0, thus contradicting the assumption that To show that k * k, note that
x j , we have, for all i > |S|:
for all possible x. Therefore, {|S| + 1, · · · , N } ⊆ S + (x * ) for any equilibrium x * , i.e., k * |S|.
(a-ii) (7a) follows from the definition of k * . For i > k * , x * i is in the interior of the feasible region,
, for all
Summing over all i = k * + 1, . . . , N , we obtain the characterization in (7b).
) > x i so that (EC.4) follows. In the remaining case,
Now, consider two equilibria x * and x * * ; without loss of generality,
follows from (EC.4) that for all i = 1, . . . , N :
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of L i (·) functions, itself the consequence of the monotonicity of the functions G
Finally, the profit and cost comparisons are immediate from the proof of part (a), see (EC.2).
• H(·) is strictly concave for all i, the function to the left of (8) is a strictly concave function of ρ, and therefore has at most two roots. Assume it has two roots ρ < ρ. Let
and note that this function is differentiable, strictly concave and strictly increasing, see the proof of part (a). F ′ (ρ) > 1 since otherwise F ′ (ρ) < 1 for R > ρ, which means that the function F (ρ) − ρ is strictly decreasing beyond the root ρ = ρ, contradicting the existence of a second root ρ. It follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that
< −1, since F is strictly increasing and F ′ (ρ) > 1. Thus, if the root ρ corresponds with an equilibrium x * (k), it follows from (7b) that for all i = k + 1, . . . , N , x * i (k) is strictly decreasing with respect to any of the minimum e-companion to Federgruen and Yang: Competition Under Generalized Attraction Models ec3 reliability standards, {x 1 , . . . , x k }, in particular, x 1 . Consider now the following restricted game in which only firms k + 1, . . . , N compete, while the others are committed to operate at their minimum reliability
In the restricted game, each supplier's action set continues to be given by a compact interval, and its log-profit functions { π j : j = k + 1, . . . , N } are unaffected. Thus, the restricted game is supermodular as well. Since x * (k) is a Nash equilibrium in the original game, the vector x * k+1 (k), . . . , x * N (k) is a Nash equilibrium in the restricted game, now that the action sets of the players have shrunk. Moreover, as the lowest feasible reliability vector in this game, it is clearly the smallest equilibrium. Since (b-iii) There are at most two equilibria with S(x * ) = ∅ by (b-ii) and at most one with S(x * ) = {1, . . . , k} for k = 1, . . . , |S| by (b-i) and none for k = |S| + 1, . . . , N by part (a-i). The number of equilibria is thus bounded by |S| + 2.
Proof of Theorem 3:
(a) The existence of an equilibrium follows from Theorem 1(a). It follows from Theorem 2(a-iii) that the set of equilibria is completely ordered. This implies that all equilibria are symmetric. (If an asymmetric equilibrium x * were to exist, every permutation of its components would be an equilibrium as well, but could not be ordered with respect to x * .) 
Also, by condition (G), the characteristic equation has at most two roots. We now show that x * is the larger (or unique) root. For all N = 2, 3, . . ., let g (N ) (ρ)
(By the monotonicity of G(·), the first inequality is equivalent to H(( N − 1)x + x) > G(x) = −∞; the proof of the second inequality is identical.) (9) on (x, x). Moreover, for The remaining case has θ
For this case, we first show that
and for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , 
, again by composing it with the monotone function G(·); this would imply that π
the fact that x is not an equilibrium. We conclude that g 
This claim follows from the fact that θ ( b N ) (·) is concave, and pointwise larger than g
follows from ( N − 1)x + ρ N ρ and the fact that the function G −1 • H is increasing as the composition of two decreasing functions.)
It follows from Claim 1 that if all firms initially choose the lowest possible attraction value x, each firm i's best response is to move to ρ( N ) > x. As mentioned in §3, the componentwise smallest equilibrium x * L ( N ) can be obtained by applying a simple tatônnement scheme, under which, starting with point x, in each iteration, each firm determines its best response to the competitor's choices. Moreover, it follows from Theorems 4.3.2 and 4.3.4 in Topkis (1998) that this scheme generates an increasing sequence of points which converge to x * L ( N ). In particular,
is a root the characteristic equation (9), it follows from Claim 2 that it equals ρ( N ) and that x * L ( N ) = x * H ( N ), i. e., the equilibrium is unique.
It remains to be shown that:
implies that x fails to be an equilibrium in an industry with N firms. Moreover, since θ (N ) (·) is concave,
where the inequality follows from the fact that θ (N ) (·) is pointwise larger than θ b (N ) (·).
The remaining case has g (N ) (x) 0, while by (EC.6), g (N ) (x) < 0 as well. Note, however that g with N firms, arg max π
e-companion to Federgruen and Yang: Competition Under Generalized Attraction Models
The first inequality follows from two facts: Finally, we have shown that, if, for a given number of suppliers N , x is not an equilibrium, the same must be true for all N N . This implies the existence of an integer N 1 (x) N 0 (x) 2, such that x is part of the equilibrium set for 2 N < N 0 (x) and x is not an equilibrium for
Since all equilibria are symmetric, other than x, there may only be interior symmetric equilibria x * = (x * , . . . , x * ). For these,
0, i.e., x * is one of the at most two roots (or solutions) of the concave function
Proof of Lemma 1: Parts (a) and (b) follow from Theorem 5 and Lemma 1 of Federgruen and Yang (2008a) . 
.
(EC.9)
We first prove the following two intermediate results:
positive, concave increasing function of R on the interval [
(i) is immediate since f (R) is a positive, concave and increasing function.
(ii) By (EC.9), we have: Note that H(R) = K(R)/R. Since K(R) and R both are positive, H(R) is also positive. More-
is a positive and decreasing function.
since K(R) is a positive and convex decreasing function. Therefore, H(R) is a positive, strictly convex and strictly decreasing function.
Proof of Theorem 5:
(a) Immediate from (4) and (EC.9).
(b) It is easily verified that for all firms i = 1, . . . , N ,
Since the competition game is supermodular, the monotonicity result with respect to w follows from Topkis (1998, Theorem 4.2 
.2).
Similarly, to obtain the other monotonicity results, it suffices to show: (1) where every firm's feasible region is increasing in w, since x i is, see (15) .To show the monotonicity with (1) 
, and the above inequality is shown by verifying that
(EC.10) (The inequality R > z 2 α may be imposed in view of (18).) We have verified (EC.10) by solving the optimization problem to the left of (EC.10) with the procedure fmincon in Matlab, starting the procedure in 10,000 randomly generated starting points:
is achieved when R = 933.3315, z α = 10 −4 and γ D = 778.0618.
is decreasing in c i and independent of c j for j = i. 
. Therefore, all equilibria in the original game remain equilibria in the modified game. Moreover, if there were an additional equilibrium x * in the modified game, it would have x * i = x i , for some i = 1, . . . , N . (Otherwise, x * is an interior point to the feasible region of the modified game and therefore an equilibrium in the original game as well.) However, ∂ π i /∂x i = In particular, x * L (p j ) and x * H (p j ), the smallest and largest equilibrium in the original game are also the smallest and largest equilibrium in the modified game. In the modified game, the feasible region of firm j is increasing in p 
EC.2. Review of Quality Competition Models in the Economics Literature
The economics literature treats quality as a differentiating attribute of the product rather than its procurement process. Customers are in the market for a single unit; the utility for a given unit is a linear function of price and quality. Shaked and Sutton (1982) , Tirole (1988) , Ronnen (1991), Choi and Shin (1992) , Motta (1993) and Wauthy (1996) characterize a pure equilibrium in a two-stage game , i = k + 1, . . . , N (EC.11b) (EC.11)
In addition, there may be at most two interior equilibria x * (0), satisfying (EC.11) with k = 0 and ρ = ρ, or ρ = ρ. The total number of equilibria is thus bounded by |S| + 2.
Proof. When the c (The inequality R > z 2 α may be imposed in view of (18).) We have verified (EC.18) by solving the optimization problem to the left of (EC.18) with the procedure fmincon in Matlab, starting the procedure in no less than 10,000 randomly generated starting points. In addition, the maximum value of zero is achieved in the optimization problem to the left of (EC.18) only when w/2c i = 0, a parameter value which cannot be achieved. This implies that for all relevant parameter combinations, Γ i (R) = (G We continue to assume that all suppliers charge the same price to each buyer (see, however, the discussion in §4.4). Often, suppliers need to charge an identical price to each of their buyers, because of legislation preventing price discrimination, e.g. the Robinson-Patman Act, or to avoid grey markets.
The logarithms of the profit functions now take the form (see (3)):
π i (x) = log w − c P i (x i ) + log x i − log (x i + x −i ) + log (Since the suppliers receive the same expected revenue from each of the buyers, there is no incentive to mix or pool production lots for different buyers. Note that pooling two production batches of size y 1 and y 2 , the supply risks associated with the pooled order are larger than those arising when the orders are handled by two independent, or at worst correlated production batches:(y 1 + y 2 ) 2 var(X) = var[X(y 1 + y 2 )] var(X 1 y 1 + X 2 y 2 ) = (y 1 ) 2 var(X) + (y 2 ) 2 var(X) + 2y 1 y 2 cov(X 1 , X 2 ).) The following Theorem shows that, the competition model continues to be (log-)supermodular, hence all of the results obtained for the case of a single buyer can be generalized.
Theorem EC.1 (Yield Predictability Competition Model with Multiple Buyers).
Consider B independent buyers with demands characterized by (EC.19), and, analogous to (10), µ l z α σ l , l = 1, . . . , B.
(a) All of the results of Theorems 2 and 3 continue to apply. The remainder of the proof is straightforward.
Remark EC.1. One may consider the generalization where different buyers adopt different maximum shortfall probabilities {α l , l = 1, . . . , B}. In this case, ∂ logπ i /∂x i continues to take the form (4).
While in all of our numerical experiments, the function H(·) continues to be decreasing under buyerdependent service levels, it is very tedious to prove this monotonicity property. In the multi-buyer case, the dependence of the equilibria on the demand characteristics, is no longer restricted to the demand volatilities {γ D,l }; i.e., for fixed values of {γ D,l }, the equilibria may depend on the relative expected mean demands. The impact of a single parameter of the buyers' demand distributions is therefore no longer unambiguous.
EC.5. Lack of Pure Nash Equilibria Under Price Differentiation
Example EC. 18 However, when the cost rate coefficients {c i } are reduced by a factor of 10, the tatônnement scheme fails to converge, irrespective of its starting point, which shows that the game fails to be supermodular. Instead, it oscillates among a group of solutions, which depends on the starting point. For example, when starting at x 0 = x = [500, 350, 275] , the scheme after two iterations, oscillates between x 1 = [193.0, 151.4, 115.3 ] and x 2 = [182. 3, 129.2, 19.0] . Under x 1 , supplier 3 is driven out of the market and suppliers 1 and 2 react by reducing their reliability to the x 2 -values. This causes the buyer to reengage supplier 3, inducing all suppliers to increase their reliability back to the values under x 1 , so as to increase market shares and force supplier 3 back out of the market. Since the scheme oscillates for each of 150 randomly generated starting points, it is unlikely that a (pure) Nash equilibrium exists in this instance. The phenomena of oscillating tatônnement schemes and lack of equilibria appears to be confined to instances with very high {w i /c i } ratios, i.e., unrealistically large supplier markups.
